Saturday, 18 April 2015

To Give You an Idea of The Potential Size of The Next Economic Crash


Something for The Week End: Inflation and Business Cycles


Wednesday, 15 April 2015

The Importance of.....Saving Money.

Why Norwegian Banks Will Be Bailed Out

Yesterday, Norges Bank, the central bank of Norway, published a speech by its deputy governor Jon Nicolaisen titled "Should banks be bailed out?". 

In the speech, Nicolaisen discusses among other things why banks are bailed out in addition to discussing various reasons why they should not. At the end of the speech under the heading "What should be done?", he concludes as follows:
So what are the lessons we have drawn?
Banks should not be bailed out, but banks' functions must be bailed out. If not, all economic activity will be affected. We will bail out the small depositors – that is both profitable and fair.
We should not bail out all creditors. If the equity capital in bank is lost, long-term lenders should also bear losses. The new tools that have now been introduced in Europe will ensure that this happens. Norwegian legislation must be updated in line with the new directive. This will improve the pricing of risk in the banking system.
We will not bail out the shareholders. Ultimately, bank owners and management must ensure that banks are run prudently. It is crucial that they are aware of their responsibilities. We cannot regulate banks to death. I am confident that owners and managers of Norwegian banks will act responsibly.
At the same time, banks must be regulated. Capital requirements must be high and we must ensure that banks are solid and well-run. This will reduce the risk of a systemic crisis. This will also give banks' owners a stronger motive to take account of long-term risk. Banks themselves and Finanstilsynet (Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway) have done a good job to ensure a solid Norwegian banking sector, so that the authorities avoid having to bail out banks.
In many ways, the speech is very informative, though the debate about whether banks should be bailed out should be laid dead. Like any other business, bank losses should not be socialised while profits are not.

The speech however fails to address the underlying problem of why banks frequently run into financial problems in the first place: their ability to lend money into existence. In this respect, he is incorrect when stating that "Banks may be regarded as intermediaries". They are not. A true intermediary would lend out only what others have saved. This is not the case for banks in the world today, including Norwegian banks. Instead, banks create a deposit liability when granting a loan thereby creating new money in the process - this is what is meant by "creating money out of thin air". 

Banks privileged ability to create new money is the primary reason the money supply in Norway has surged from less than NOK527 billion in December 1995 to more than NOK1.9 trillion as of February this year - an increase of almost 261% in less than 20 years! 


These very deposits created out of nothing can again be used to extend further loans. This is perhaps what Nicolaisen had in mind when suggesting banks "may be regarded as intermediaries". Again, a true financial intermediary don't create new money when lending what others have saved. There is a big difference between the two, a difference also bankers regularly fail to see or to understand if they do see it. According to numbers today released by Statistics Norway, banks in the country now finance 87.5% of their customer loans (which excludes financial institutions) with these kinds of deposits. 


If we add the deposits from and loans to financial institutions, the ratio increases to 90.5% as of February. The two ratios demonstrate that the majority of the loans issued by banks are financed with the very deposits the banks themselves created in the first place. It works like a gigantic Ponzi scheme as new loans are largely financed by deposits created from nothing at an earlier stage. However, it's much more sinister as it affects all and not just the hopeful speculators taking part (aware or not) in a Ponzi scheme. 

What about equity financing? The painful truth is that it is largely nonexistent as a source of bank financing in Norway. In the U.S., banks finance around 10.8% of their total assets with equity capital, an extremely low percentage compared to non-bank businesses. For Norwegian banks, this figure is currently an eye-opening 6.9%! 


As the market values of bank assets fluctuate with time and as bank liabilities are largely fixed (as deposits, i.e. cash liabilities, make up more than 70% of total liabilities), banks' equity capital could be wiped out if the value of assets drop by just 6.9%. Such a drop should not be viewed as an unlikely scenario. On this note, we should acknowledge that house prices can go down as well. "Financial stability is one of Norges Bank's primary objectives in its efforts to ensure economic stability" according to its website. Then why in the world doesn't it do anything about the shamefully low equity financing for Norwegian banks, the very source of "systemic risk" combined with banks ability to create money out of thin air? A marginal "capital buffer" will not do the trick. Nor will an equity to total assets ratio similar to that in the U.S. do the trick. 

In conclusion, the bank bailout debate continues unabated despite the 2008 banking crisis in the U.S. and Europe. The debate continues because the fundamental causes of bank instability, and with it economic instability, namely banks ability to create money out of thin air and low equity capital financing made possible through Norges Bank as the lender of last resort, are not being addressed other than paying lip service to marginally higher capital ratios. Nicolaisen's speech is therefore largely irrelevant as, given the poor state of Norwegian banks, Norges Bank will provide liquidity to the banks again next time around just as it did in 2008 and 2009. This per definition constitutes a bailout. 

"Central banks have traditionally acted as lender of last resort (LLR). This means that when liquidity demands cannot be met from other sources, the central bank can provide extraordinary liquidity to individual banks or the wider banking system."


Meanwhile, Norwegian banks continue to fuel further "imbalances" and "systemic risk" as the money printing presses are running hot...


...creating the very vicious cycle Norges Bank and other regulators are supposed to protect the country against. What an irony.


With such reckless monetary expansion orchestrated by Norges Bank and blessed by the Norwegian government, vastly outpacing the amount of gold dug up, there is little wonder the Norwegian Krone (the local currency) has lost more than 97% of its value against gold since 1971.




For more on Norwegian banks also see: 

Tuesday, 14 April 2015

U.S. Recession Alert: Inventory to Sales Ratio Increases Faster than September 2008

This should not go unnoticed: the inventory to sales ratio for U.S. business came in at 1.36 for February. This was unchanged from January. Ignoring last month and the intermediate aftermath of banking crisis, this was the highest ratio reported since October 2008. 

Perhaps more importantly, the ratio expanded 4.6% in February on a y/y basis which was even higher than the 3.1% expansion in September 2008. 


As a range of other indicators also suggest the U.S. economy is in a very bad place (e.g. here and here) and much worse than in 2008, the surge in the ratio above is yet another warning sign that a recession as defined by the establishment is lurking. 

Recessionary Level in Credit Conditions

By Alexander Giryavets

The Credit Managers Index deteriorated significantly over the last two months and current readings stand at the recessionary levels not seen since 2008. There is a very serious financial stress in the amount of credit extended to the businesses and the amount of credit applications rejected. The speed of deterioration is shocking.


Ten Charts Demonstrating the 2015 U.S. Stock Market Euphoria (updated as of 10 April 2015)

In December last year I published a selection of charts demonstrating the surge in stock prices and how they had dislocated from a range of fundamentals during 2013 and 2014. Here are the same ten charts, but updated as of 10 April. Most of the charts look even worse now than four months ago. 











Monday, 13 April 2015

The Crank Report, 13 April 2015




You can download the first two issues of The Crank Report here.

Tuesday, 7 April 2015

Stocks and the Fundamental Backdrop: The New Strategy is “Hope”

By Pater Tenebrarum

When Will Bad News Cease to be Good News for Stocks?

It is quite amazing to watch this. Even as one economic datum after another indicates that a major slowdown is underway that could well turn into a recession (keep in mind that this is not a certainty – at similar junctures in recent years, aggregate economic data recovered just in the nick of time), the US stock market continues to take everything in stride.

The most recent example was the enormous “miss” of the payrolls report on Friday. The cash market was closed on Friday, but US stock futures still traded briefly after the release and declined sharply. Whatever concerns futures traders had were evidently forgotten by Monday. After all, weak jobs data mean more free money from the central bank for longer, as the much talked about rate hike will likely be put off further.

It appears though that we didn’t really get the memo. According to press reports, the market’s sanguine reception of the payrolls data miss isn’t driven by expectations about central bank policy. Instead, the main driver is “hope”. Hope is generally not thought to be an investment strategy, but there it is. What is even more curious is what the hope is all about. A headline at Reuters reads: Stock markets hope earnings offset weak economic data”. Say what?

Continue reading the article here.

Monday, 6 April 2015

How Liquidity Drives The US Stock Market

By Dr Frank Shostak

In a market economy a major service that money provides is that of the medium of exchange. Producers exchange their goods for money and then exchange money for other goods.

As production of goods and services increases this results in a greater demand for the services of the medium of exchange (the service that money provides).

Conversely, as economic activity slows down the demand for the services of money follows suit.

The demand for the services of the medium of exchange is also affected by changes in prices. An increase in the prices of goods and services leads to an increase in the demand for the medium of exchange.

People now demand more money to facilitate more expensive goods and services. A fall in the prices of goods and services results in a decline in the demand for the medium of exchange.

Now, take the example where an increase in the supply of money for a given state of economic activity has taken place. Since there wasn’t any change in the demand for the services of the medium of exchange this means that people now have a surplus of money or an increase in monetary liquidity.

Obviously no individual wants to hold more money than is required. An individual can get rid of surplus cash by exchanging the money for goods.

All the individuals as a group however cannot get rid of the surplus of money just like that. They can only shift money from one individual to another individual.

The mechanism that generates the elimination of the surplus of cash is the increase in the prices of goods. Once individuals start to employ the surplus cash in acquiring goods this pushes prices higher.